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Abstract

In this paper, I look to answer an issue I have found in my personal studies. I have frequently found
that my personal interest, Indian philosophy, finds very little legitimacy in the academic field of philosophy. In
this paper, I will compare the work of ancient Indians with contemporaneous Greeks to demonstrate that it is,
in fact, philosophy. Then, I will address the common charge that Indian thought is too religious to be
philosophy. After proving that Indian texts have every reason to be considered philosophy, I will investigate
why Indian thinkers are excluded from the canon; I will examine the role of the Kantian school of philosophy
in building a racist narrative of philosophy as a European actiity. Finally, I will consider the ramifications of
perpetuating this very Eurocentric image of philosophy before challenging the institutions of philosophy to
address the issue.
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“The first [rational] thinkers … emerged in the
ancient Greek world in the 6th century BC.”1

Introduction
Who were the first philosophers? Virtually every introductory-level philosophy class
gives this distinction to the ancient Greeks. Typically, this is one of the first pieces of information
that every student of philosophy learns. The Greeks of antiquity, we are taught, were the
inventors of rational thought. They made Greece the original, singular locus of philosophy from
which all contemporary philosophical traditions eventually grew. This is the perennial truth that
nearly every contemporary Western narrative of philosophy affirms. This well-accepted and
widely-promulgated account of philosophy as Greek achievement is not, however, the only
version of the story.
According to my own observations, Indian philosophy is very rarely discussed in the
West. Its greatest thinkers, developments, and history are all unfamiliar to most of the
philosophers that I have known; it is subaltern in the context of academic philosophy. Indeed, in
discussions with professional philosophers educated at various institutions across the nation, all
but two or three (out of dozens) have admitted a total unfamiliarity with ancient Indian thought.
By their own accounts, Indian texts and thinkers were not topics that they had ever seriously
been asked to study or consider. The lack of serious consideration given to classical Indian texts,
though many certainly appear to be philosophical, perhaps explains why these works are largely
omitted from discussions of ancient philosophy. In the face of this systematic neglect of Indian
philosophy, I was left wondering: does ancient Indian thought really even count as philosophy?
To add to my confusion, I have been repeatedly encouraged to consider graduate programs
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outside of the field of philosophy in order study classical Indian philosophy. Departments of
history, religious studies, and East Asian studies have all been suggested as more suitable
environments for someone wishing to study ancient Indian thought. This made clear to me that,
although there was a common rhetoric that posited the existence of Asian philosophies, the
paucity of Asian thought in the field of philosophy was intentional. I began to take interest in the
tenuous relationship between Western academic philosophy and studies of Indian thought, as
Indian philosophy in the contemporary West seems to simultaneously hold the status of
philosophy and not philosophy. Indian thought is allowed the label of 'philosophy,' but its study is
evidently not the work of philosophers. I will show that the exclusion of Indians from the
philosophical canon, then, has less to do with the content of Indian philosophies themselves than
with the institutions that determine what philosophies are worth studying.
Of course, before attempting to answer the question as to whether ancient Indians did
philosophy, I should first clarify what I mean by “philosophy.” The exact definition of
philosophy is something that continues to be debated by scholars; there are arguably as many
definitions of philosophy as there are philosophers. In light of this, I chose a definition of
philosophy for this paper that would be fairly agreeable to most professional philosophers. I also
picked a definition that would encompass most or all of the current Western philosophical canon.
What I mean by philosophy, then, is a coherent system of rational and reflective investigations
that use analysis and argumentation to pose and attempt to answer questions in fields such as
ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. Philosophy, as a rule, aims to understand things as
they really are. Philosophy is the pursuit of objective truths.
By this definition, philosophy has had a far richer and more diverse history than a typical
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philosophy class might reveal. Although there is certainly an argument to be made that this sort
of philosophy is found to have independent origins in many places throughout history, few
regions produced as many significant and diverse traditions as the Indian subcontinent. It's
difficult to say which school of Indian thought was the first truly “philosophical” tradition, but
methodical and systematic approaches to topics of philosophical concern were certainly present
in the subcontinent by the beginning of India's classical period (about 200 BCE). There is
evidence of a “protophilosophy” in India that can be traced back to the composition of the
Upanishads, but Indologist Johannes Bronkhorst asserts that “the available evidence suggests
that no tradition of rational inquiry (in the sense here intended, manifested by critical debate and
attempts to create coherent views of reality) existed in India before [the 300s BCE].”2 For
simplicity's sake, I will leave the philosophical value of earlier Indian texts like the Upanishads
as the subject for another essay and will limit the scope of this paper primarily to Indian
philosophies of the 4th century BCE through the early classical period (about 650 CE) so that I
may compare and contrast them with roughly contemporaneous schools of Greek thought. Of
course, even though I will discuss only a few examples of classical Indian philosophy, they are
far from representative of all ancient schools of Indian thought. The schools of Indian philosophy
are simply far too many in number and too diverse in kind to be individually addressed, so I will
focus primarily on specific instances that will prove the existence of philosophy in India more
generally.

2
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Indian Thought as Compared to Greek Philosophy
Quite apart from being the uniquely Greek pursuit that most Ancient philosophy courses
teach it to be, philosophy of both familiar and alien kinds was to be found in Classical India.
Despite using terminology and imagery that is unfamiliar to Western sensibilities, Indian
philosophers tackle many of the same topics as their Greek counterparts. Although distinctly
Indian in both style and approach, many ancient Indian texts, like the Mahābhārata or the
Dîgha-Nikâya, are written in a style of argumentative dialogue that is reminiscent of Plato's
Republic or Timaeus. One of the ideological ways in which classical Indian philosophy most
closely resembles that of contemporaneous Greek thought is in the area of ethics. The Buddhist
traditions, in particular, are especially fit for comparisons to the works of Plato. Now, at first
glance, the ethical system of values presented by Plato might seem unrelated to the ethical
systems of the various schools of Buddhism, which all have enlightenment as their aim. Upon
closer examination, though, the two systems have significant aspects in common.
Buddhism
Buddhist tradition is largely centered around a quest for nirvāṇa, enlightenment that
results in freedom from suffering (dukkha). The first step to attaining nirvāṇa is through ethical
behavior. People must adopt the habits of good behavior as a way to counteract the poisons
(kleśa) of greed, hatred, and delusion that keep a person in the cycle of suffering and rebirth
(saṃsāra).3 For Buddhists, an ethical life is an absolute prerequisite for liberation, and a truly
ethical life cannot be attained through good deeds alone. An ethical life can only be attained
through philosophy. According to Buddhist tradition, by doing philosophy through rational

3

Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction, 79

Westrope 8
inquiry, one can come to know the truth about the world. For most Buddhists, this entails coming
to the realization that there is no unified and unchanging self. Buddhists, however, cannot simply
reach nirvāṇa by being told that there is no self. They must do philosophy and come to
understand this revelation themselves. Doing philosophy results in an awareness of what
behavior is good; it is the Buddhist ideal to not prioritize oneself over others and to minimize
suffering.4 Doing philosophy also allows one to come to understand why certain behaviors are
good; because there is no distinct entity of self, “there is no reason to prefer our own welfare
over that of others.”5 Ethical behavior is the natural result of the knowledge that results from
doing philosophy and an understanding of the true nature of things.
Eudaimonia: the Greek Nirvāṇa
Although Buddhism is rooted in a metaphysical view of the self that is fundamentally
different from what Plato and his students in Greece were doing – Platonists recognized the
existence of a self and discrete external objects while early Buddhists did not – the Buddha and
Plato have similar prescriptions for an ethical life. Aspirations for an ideal state of being motivate
the writings on ethics of both Greek and Indian philosophers. While the Buddhists aspired to
reach nirvāṇa, numerous Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle included, had the notion of
eudaimonia, often translated as happiness or well-being, as the ultimate good. The Greeks
reasoned that the highest good for humankind must be specific to humans. Being eudaimon was
the result of virtue (aretê, also translated as excellence). Achieving eudaimonia, then, was
attributed to excellence in the uniquely human activity of reason. Philosophy, being the ultimate
exercise in rationality, was identified as crucial to becoming eudaimon. For Aristotle, “using
4
5
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reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well
requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the
rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence.”6 Eudaimonia is achieved through
continuous action, the unending exercise of reason.
Though Aristotle also thought material circumstances like noble birth or physical
attractiveness could aid or impede the achievement of eudaimonia, his prescription for bliss is
much the same as that of the Buddha. Although Aristotle thought that the very act of doing
philosophy was a continuous and necessary activity for the end of eudaimonia, Buddhists treated
philosophy as the means to the end of knowledge. When the metaphysics of self, however, are
removed and the remaining ethical theories compared, what remains is two systems that assert
that the ideal human state of happiness can only be achieved through the use of reason. In both
systems, goodness is a combination of right deeds and theoretical knowledge.
Indian Religion as Philosophy
It would appear that Indian and Greek philosophies are (at least sometimes) similarly
motivated. However, Indian philosophy, as both scholars7 and my own personal experience can
confirm, is often disregarded as being “too religious” to be studied in departments of philosophy.
The latent assumption in this statement is that there must be an absolute division between
philosophy and religion and that the study of religion must be a thing wholly apart from studies
of philosophy. Is this a reasonable position to hold? In brief, my answer is no. When A.H.
Armstrong describes religious philosophies as problematic “because their reason throughout

6
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depends consciously on divine faith and grace,” he rests his entire assessment on a very
particular and narrow definition of religion.8 The problem with this approach, as Mark Siderits
describes it, is that it is grounded in an idea of religion as it is commonly understood in the
contemporary West, but which is markedly different from religion as it existed in ancient India.
Because Westerners are frequently exposed primarily to the faith-based and monotheistic
Abrahamic religions, faith (and the dogmatism that may accompany it) is often presumed to be a
central element of religion in general.9 “To think of religion this way,” says Siderits, “is to see it
as a set of beliefs that one accepts out of a conviction that is not based on rational argumentation.
Religion is then seen as falling on the 'heart' side of the head/heart, or reason/faith, divide.”10
In reality, though, many classical Indian religions bear little resemblance to the faithbased forms of religion found so commonly in the West. “The concerns of [all] religion[s] are, in
a word, soteriological,” states Siderits, but many classical Indian religions take a radically
different approach to soteriology from the Abrahamic religions.11 To declare that matters of
philosophy and religion must be distinct “is to suppose that soteriological concerns can only be
addressed through a form of emotional commitment.”12 This view, however, was not held by
ancient Indians, who instead thought that “it made perfectly good sense to use our rational
faculties in the pursuit of salvation, … [of liberation] from an unsatisfactory way of being.”13
Contrary to the Abrahamic religions, which require the acceptance of and obedience to certain
doctrines on the basis of faith, many sects of classical Indian religion believe that systematic
8
9
10
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rational inquiry and self-reflection are the only ways to attain enlightenment and liberation.
While a Christian must accept the teachings of Christ as divine and therefore above criticism and
reproach, “Buddhists are not expected to accept … claims just because the Buddha taught
them.”14 Indeed, as I mentioned previously, the Buddha's teachings were intended to be a guide
to help others reach enlightenment. Even in early Buddhist teachings, reaching nirvāṇa has
always required more than simple adherence to doctrines; it can only be attained through reason
and critical engagement. To attain liberation, one must not merely know; he must understand.
The Indian form of religion sans faith, then, does not present the problems over which Armstrong
expressed concern.
Buddhism was not the only nontheistic religion in classical India. In fact, several classical
Indian religious traditions were nontheistic in the sense that they did not appeal to a god to
justify their doctrines. For example, the modern Indian philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
wrote that
the Samkhya [school] is silent about the existence of God, though certain about its
theoretical indemonstrability. … [The Mimamsa sage] Jaimini refers to God only to
deny his providence and moral government of the world, … [and the] early Buddhist
systems are known to be indifferent to God.15
Even among the numerous classical Indian religions that do assert the existence of gods,
they [the gods] play no role whatever in the quest for [liberation]. Perhaps worship
and sacrifice to the right gods might win one various mundane benefits, … [b]ut the
gods cannot bestow [enlightenment] on us. [Liberation] is something that one can
only attain for oneself; enlightened beings can only help others by giving them
pointers along the way.16
The gods found in ancient Indian religions are, in many ways, akin to those of the ancient
14
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Greeks. The Hindu gods, though both powerful and long-lived, are neither omnipotent nor
immortal. Their influence on human life is limited to power over the external factors in an
individual's life, and just as Zeus couldn't bestow eudaimonia on the Greek people, neither could
Brahmā grant someone enlightenment. Indian religions, with relatively few exceptions, placed
great importance on the value of human rationality and its use in attaining liberation. Many
Indian religions are, quite apart from the systems of religion-as-faith that are dominant in the
modern West, indeed simply systems of philosophy with soteriological aims.
Do the soteriological ends of ancient Indian philosophies provide justification for their
exclusion from discussions on philosophy and for their relegation to studies of religion? Here,
again, my answer is no. As I demonstrated above, both ancient Greek and Indian philosophers
discussed the ideal state of humans: a state of happiness that could only be achieved through the
use of reason. What separates the two traditions is that while eudaimonia was related only to
one's present life, nirvāṇa (and the related Hindu moksha) were intended to break the cycle of
rebirth. This belief in a cycle of rebirth, though, certainly did not impede the the development of
classical Indian philosophy. Even so, the reference to religious figures and use of allegories in
philosophical debate in many Indian (particularly Hindu) philosophies has led some to dismiss
Indian philosophy as being more mythos, taken to be fantastical and unsubstantiated, than logos,
taken to be perfectly reasoned and rational. As mythos, Indian philosophy must be irrational and
unworthy of study as philosophy.
Greek Philosophy as Mythos
However, the insistence that philosophy must be logos separated from mythos is a
criterion that is applied inconsistently. Plato, generally accepted in the West as being one of the
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first great philosophers, did not accept that philosophy could be divided into logos and mythos,
even though he lived well after this separation had first been proposed. In Robert Fowler's essay
“Mythos and Logos,” he discusses the various ways in which the Sophists attempted to separate
mythos from logos in their work and how Plato, who was open about his distaste for the work of
the Sophists, rejected their efforts to completely separate mythos from logos as being both
fruitless and in vain. Fowler states that, in Plato's work, “there are two kinds of logoi, one of
which is mythos … the point is not just an innocuous one that all discourse is logos, including
mythos, but more fundamentally that mythos has a very complicated relationship with logos in
the philosopher's pursuit of truth.”17 Since logos and mythos always inhere in the same entities
on Earth, Fowler continues:
trying to isolate logos from mythos [on Earth] produces an infinite regress as we try
to distinguish logos from mythos using a faculty which is itself a mix of logos and
mythos in unknown proportions. … Notoriously, in the Timaios the whole of the
Republic is called a mythos; indeed, it is designated an imaginative construct such as
was unlikely ever to come into existence. … Conversely, the story of Atlantis is
presented emphatically as a true logos. … It is … called a logos, but the idea of
probability comes up repeatedly, which must undercut this to some extent: it is
(probably!) more logos than mythos, but that is all we can truthfully say.18
Indeed, much of Plato's work takes as fact what, to modern readers, is unproven and therefore the
stuff of mythos. Plato's Timaeus, for instance, is riddled with talk of gods, heavenly forces, and
other mythological topics, but it is still considered to be a philosophical text. Instead of omitting
the entirety of Plato's work on the basis of his mythos, modern philosophers typically set these
portions of his work aside. If Plato is given such allowances, why aren't Indian thinkers?
It seems dismissals of Indian philosophies as being too religious or mythical are based on

17
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assumptions about the 'mystical' culture of India. John Locke, for example, revealed his total
unfamiliarity with Indian philosophies when he wrote:
Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth wanted something to
bear it up) but thought of this word 'substance' he needed not to have been at the
trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant; the
word substance would have done it effectively.19
Here, Locke assumes that Indian philosophies take as truth the Hindu myth that Earth is
supported on the back of an elephant, which in turn is standing on the back of a turtle. “It would
be impossible, [though],” declares B.K. Matilal, “to find a text in classical Indian philosophy
where the elephant-tortoise device is put forward as a philosophic explanation of the support of
the earth.”20 In fact, the Hindu Vaisheshika Sutra coined a term for substance (dravya) no less
than two centuries before the Common Era, and it had nothing to do with either elephants or
tortoises. If we adopted Locke's method of treating another culture's myths as its philosophy,
says Richard King, “we could reject the Greek philosophical tradition on the basis of the Greek
belief that the world is held aloft by the shoulder of Atlas.”21 Though ancient Indian philosophies
certainly had elements of mythos in them, to reject them as philosophy while accepting the work
of ancient Greeks like Plato shows an unfamiliarity with the material that is being dismissed as
well as a tacit acceptance of the double standard that consistently works against the philosophies
of nonwhites. This sets a pattern that devalues non-Western philosophies because they come
from remote and unfamiliar lands.

19
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The Historical Basis for the Dismissal of Indian Philosophy
If philosophy has not always been purely logos, even in the West, then the mythos/logos
distinction must be historically grounded. The notion of a strict mythos/logos dichotomy
developed alongside the reason/tradition (or philosophy/religion) split of the European
Enlightenment. The attempts to separate mythos from logos, reason from tradition, and religion
from philosophy were treated as natural and necessary preconditions for mankind's rational
development. This perspective is, however, far from a universal one. Rather than articulating any
sort of a priori truth about the nature of either, the uniquely European division of philosophy and
religion into two separate disciplines can be traced to certain contingent political and social
causes in Enlightenment-era Europe.22 “The authority of 'Theology' in European universities was
undermined by intellectuals [in the modern era] who were unhappy … with the ecclesiastical
authority within society.”23 The clash between religious institutions and academics led to the
creation of this dichotomy between the “detached and deliberate” field of philosophy and
religion, the “subjective commitments that are not open to rational investigation and scrutiny.”24
“The principle of rationality,” as King states, “has often been upheld in the west as a culturally
independent and neutral faculty capable of promoting freedom of thought and thereby firmly
distinguished from a dogmatic adherence to (religious) tradition.”25 Religion, tradition, and
mythos had come to be associated in the West with blind dogmatism. The European discipline of
philosophy, which prided itself on its use of reason to discover universal truths, developed an
attitude that eschewed all religious traditions on this (historically contingent) basis. From then
22
23
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on, attempts “[t]o exclude the so-called 'spiritual' aspects of Indian thought from the category of
'philosophy' … project the Enlightenment dichotomy between philosophy and religion onto
materials where such a polarity does not exist.26
Dismissal Not on the Basis of Religion: Indian Materialism
Presenting the ancient Greeks as concerned only with rationality while painting ancient
Indians as mystics is not only misguided, it is outright wrong. Even if we suppose that the
distinctions between religion/philosophy and tradition/reason are, in fact, necessary
preconditions for the practice of philosophy proper, such anti-traditional and irreligious schools
of thought also existed in classical India. The best example of anti-traditional philosophy in
classical India is the school of Cārvāka, also known as the Lokayata (from loka, meaning
earth/world), a school of Indian materialism whose seminal work, the now-lost Brhaspatya
Sutras, may date back as far as 600 BCE. The Cārvākas “deny God, ridicule the priests, revile
the Vedas and seek salvation in pleasure.”27 The Medieval Indian doxographer Madhava Acharya
quoted Bṛhaspati, the semi-mythical writer of the Bṛhaspatya Sutras,28 as saying:
There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world. … [These
concepts] were made … as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and
manliness. If a beast slain in [sacrifice] will itself go to heaven, why then does the
sacrificer forthwith not offer his own father? … When the body becomes ashes, how
can it ever return again? … Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that brahmins
[priests] have established here [a]ll these ceremonies. … The three authors of the
Vedas were buffoons [and] knaves.29
The Cārvākas, from what can be gathered of extant commentaries, believed that sense-perception
26
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was the only independent means of knowledge. They rejected revelation and even inferential
reasoning (anumāṇa) as valid ways of acquiring knowledge,
clearly [reflecting] anxieties about the ways in which logical inferences could be
applied to justify belief in the existence of … gods, demons, and heavenly realms. …
This of course, created problems for the Materialists since they used arguments to
substantiate their own position and refute the views of others. [Some Materialists]
distinguished between inferences about the past and inferences concerned the future
[or supernatural forces] … since [only inferences about the past] could be directly
verified by sense-perceptions.30
Though many ancient and Medieval Indian commentaries on Cārvāka thought seem to equate
classical Indian materialism with an unsophisticated form of hedonism, these are, at best, of
questionable reliability. Of the surviving works regarding materialism, most come either from
proponents of opposing philosophical schools or from authors writing about Cārvāka after its
apparent disappearance in the 12th century. Classical Indian students of Cārvāka developed
distinctions between 'crude' and 'developed' materialism, with the latter positing a hierarchy of
pleasures, placing intellectual pursuits above purely physical ones. Although a central tenet of
materialism was a disbelief in absolute moral right and wrong, many of the materialists still
sought to form systems of ethics. As with the Buddhists, the common goal of Cārvāka ethics was
to avoid activity that would cause harm to others. “Clearly then,” stresses King, “the Cārvāka
position was not a form of unsophisticated or unreflective hedonism and in this regard can be
compared to the Greek Epicureans.”31
Philosophy of both theistic and atheistic kinds flourished in ancient India. If one were to
attempt to explain the absence of Hindu (or even Buddhist and Jain) philosophies from the

30
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curricula of philosophy courses across the West on the basis of religion, as is often done, what
explanation could there be for the neglect of even the anti-traditional and atheistic schools of
Indian thought? It seems that, for many contemporary philosophers, understandings of what
deserves to be called philosophy and who can be called philosophers come, ironically, from the
tradition of the discipline. The assumption that there must be a distinction between mythos and
logos or faith and reason in philosophy is, as I have previously discussed, a uniquely Western
feature rooted in historical contingencies. This artificial dichotomy has become tradition in
Western academic philosophy and is now commonly accepted (too often without critical
evaluation) as a necessary and universal requirement for the practice of philosophy.
Omission as a Result of Ignorance
Just as the notion of a necessary religion/philosophy dichotomy was born of history and
propagated as an a priori truth through academic institutions, so too was the omission of
nonwhite philosophers, even those whose work meets the Western criteria for 'philosophy,' from
the Western canon. I have encountered many contemporary philosophers that know little to
nothing about non-Western philosophies but, even still, are quick to dismiss them as
unphilosophical. None that I have encountered have considered how they might have such
knowledge regarding material that they themselves have not studied. 'If the Indians had actually
been doing philosophy since ancient times,' the thinking of many of these professional
philosophers seems to go, 'I would have encountered it/learned about it during my studies of
philosophy.' Even after having this problem pointed out, I've seen relatively few Western
philosophers that are particularly interested in assessing the validity of this mode of thinking,
and, as a result, continue to insist that nothing worth studying as philosophy existed in the
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ancient world outside of Greece. This mentality is evidenced by the abundance of histories of
philosophy that do not ever question how we know that the Greeks were the first philosophers.
This is the exact type of uncritical thinking that philosophers claim to avoid by divorcing
themselves from religion and tradition. Indeed, this parochialism endemic in Western philosophy
perpetuates the racist notion of philosophy as an exclusively European activity that has stood,
largely unchanged, as the dominant narrative in the field for roughly two hundred years.
In the same way that the mythos/logos distinction was not always a central component of
Western philosophy, neither was Eurocentric parochialism. Prior to the late eighteenth century,
philosophy was generally believed to have originated independently in several locations.
Although historians of philosophy debated exactly which cultures developed proper philosophy
in ancient times, the most commonly cited loci for its development were Egypt, Greece, China,
and India. Part of the debate surrounding the birthplace(s) of philosophy revolved around the
particular definition of philosophy and its relation to religion.
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Historiography of Philosophy
In the mid-to-late 1700s, however, two major shifts occurred within the field of the
history of philosophy: a narrative style of history that was based on the evaluation of the material
presented was adopted, and theories of race began to be incorporated into the evaluations of the
philosophies discussed. Although the reasons for these developments are certainly numerous, the
work of Immanuel Kant played a crucial role in the 18th century changes to the field of the
history of philosophy. The predominant approach to histories of philosophy prior to Kant tended
to organize philosophical movements chronologically, give biographies and historical context
about major philosophers, and present their philosophies without evaluation. One such example
was Jacob Brucker's early eighteenth century history of philosophy, Historia critica
philosophiae, which was originally a large five volume work (a sixth was later added) that
covered theoretical works from Africa, Asian, and Europe. Brucker, like many before him, wrote
in a “'lives and opinions' mode.”32
Kant on Philosophy as Progress
To Kant, however, this was simply unacceptable. In his view, histories of philosophy
should, in themselves, be an exercise in philosophy. Whereas history was a discipline concerned
with accidentals and contingencies, Kant believed that doing philosophy helped progress the
human species. Like many of his day, Kant believed that humans were created with a purpose,
and, quite like one might expect from an Enlightenment-era philosopher, he believed that that
this purpose was to achieve rationality. This goal, however, applies only to the species as a
whole, not to individuals, because

32
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reason itself does not operate instinctively, but rather needs attempts, practice and
instruction in order gradually to progress from one stage of insight to another. … [I]f
nature has only set the term of [a person's] life as short (as has actually happened),
then nature perhaps needs an immense series of generations, each of which transmits
its enlightenment to the next, in order to propel … our species to that stage of
development which is completely suited to its aim [of rationality].33
Since doing philosophy is the “attempts, practice and instruction” Kant describes as necessary
for man to progress towards the ideal of rationality, a history of philosophy is therefore the
history of the necessary progress humans towards a goal of rationality that we must eventually
reach. A Kantian history of philosophy, therefore, needs to very clearly show this progress of the
species towards rationality in order to be a proper history of philosophy and not a mere history of
ideas.
Since, according to Kant, the development of rationality has been a gradual one over the
course of human history, histories of philosophy must present a narrative that demonstrates how
mankind has progressed from the nascent and immature philosophies of the ancients to the
advanced and highly-rational philosophies of Kant and his followers. In a sense, the ancient
philosophers were like babies. Just as babies have the potential to reason as adults do, the
philosophers of the still-young human race had the potential to reason just as the moderns did;
just as babies make mistakes that they will learn from as they grow older, the earliest
philosophers made mistakes in reason from which later generations of man learned. In this sense,
Kantian histories of philosophy must be evaluative. They must show what errors were made in
older philosophies and how these errors were addressed and corrected by later philosophers. This
application of a priori principles to previous philosophies is both proof of progress and the basis
for the narrative of progress, in that it creates a dialogue whereby modern philosophers can
33
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engage with older texts and prove that advancements towards an ultimate rationality have been
made. In order to show this progress, it must present a narrative with both a beginning and an
end.34
Kant and the Dismissal of Nonwhites
How, then, did Kant contribute to the exclusion and dismissal of Indian schools of
thought from the field of philosophy if the goal of Kantian histories of philosophy was
principally to show human progress from the infantile philosophies of the ancients to the
culmination of philosophy with Kant's “true metaphysics”?35 He did so by dismissing the work
of non-Europeans on the basis of race. When Kant writes about the origins of the races in his
essays “On the Different Human Races” and “On the Use of Teleological Principles in
Philosophy,” he seeks to provide an explanation for the many apparent differences between
peoples of different regions. He describes the different racial characteristics as being the result of
the first humans settling in different regions around the globe and adapting to the many different
climates of the world. He divided humans into four races: the (Native American) Hunnish, the
Negro, the (Asian Indian) Hindu, and the White. Each race had distinct physical and mental
characteristics that would be common to every member of that race.36 After a period of time,
these early humans stopped adapting, and the characteristics they had developed began to be
reproduced in their offspring. The characteristics that were reproduced predictably and
unfailingly through generations are what Kant classifies as racial traits.
Based on the racial characteristics he described, Kant created a hierarchy of the races. At
34
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the top were the white race, who Kant said “contains all incentives and talents in itself; and so
one must observe it more carefully. … If a revolution occurred, it was always brought about by
the whites.”37 Second in the hierarchy was the Hindu race, of which Kant said, “they acquire
culture in the highest degree, but only in the arts and not the sciences. They never raise it up to
abstract concepts. … The Hindus always remain as they are, they never bring culture further.”38
Below the Whites and Hindus were the Negroes, who Kant said could “be educated, but only to
the education of servants,” and who, apart from the Americans, “undoubtedly holds the lowest of
all … levels that we have designated as racial differences.”39 At the bottom of the racial
hierarchy is the Hunnish race, who, “despite the proximity of example and ample
encouragement,” are “incapable of any culture.”40 Philosophy, which is culture par excellence,
could only ever be advanced by the whites. It was this knowledge that allowed Kant to dismiss
ancient Indian or Egyptian texts; he thought that people incapable of cultural progress wrote
them. Because Kant believed that nonwhite races were incapable of the sorts of abstract thinking
required for philosophy, he believed that they were also incapable of progressing the human
species. The narrative of progress he prescribed for histories of philosophy meant that schools of
thought that didn't contribute to the development of rationality in mankind must be excluded
from histories of philosophy on the basis that they were not, in fact, philosophical. This meant
that, of the four locations that had once commonly been held as birthplaces of philosophy, only
Greece deserved a place in a Kantian history of philosophy.
Immanuel Kant himself never wrote a history of philosophy, but two of his students,
37
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Johann Buhle and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tenneman, wrote Kantian histories of philosophy. While
Buhle entertained the thought that Indians may have been doing a “mixed up” version of the
“doctrines of the most celebrated Greek philosophical schools [that] were disseminated in India
… after Alexander's conquest,” he still largely glosses over non-European traditions. Tenneman
skirted the issue of non-Western philosophy entirely and merely claimed that philosophy
originated with the Greeks.41 Echoing Kant, Tenneman said that “[h]istory of philosophy is
exposition of the successive development of philosophy,” and used this rationale to justify his
exclusion of non-Europeans from his history of philosophy.42 This narrative style of histories of
philosophy quickly became the norm in Germany. A contemporary of Kant and his students, the
French philosopher Joseph-Marie de Gérando observed that “no example of a revolution [was] as
swift as that which was affected in Germany by the doctrines of Kant.”43 By the mid-nineteenth
century, the Kantian-style narrative approach to histories of philosophy had become fairly
standard in Western traditions of philosophy, and Greece had become well-accepted as the
birthplace of philosophy.
Secularization and Racism
It was also during this period that scholars began retroactively secularizing the
philosophies of the ancient Greeks in order to make them more closely fit the narrative of the
progress of philosophy that was being developed by Kantians. Modern philosophers used the
distinctions Aristotle drew between theoria, phronesis, and techne, to mark the moment in which
philosophy became a matter of pure theory (as opposed to the practical knowledge that was so
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well-developed in the East) and to locate the birthplace of philosophy in Europe. Increasingly,
philosophy was becoming “characterised by a detachment from practical concerns … [which
allowed the thinker] to view the world from a disinterested and non-participatory [position].”44
When Edmund Husserl declared that “only in the Greeks do we have … the essentially new form
of a purely 'theoretical' attitude,” he assigns to ancient Greeks the unique ability to “universally
… [assess] truth claims and [apply] critical thought to all truth-claims including those of one's
own tradition.”45 The widespread secularization of philosophy, combined with an academicallysanctioned relegation of nonwhites to the category of the inferior and historically insignificant
with its roots in Enlightenment era theory, all but guaranteed that the many diverse philosophical
traditions of India would be effectively removed from Western philosophical discourse. After
Kant, the Western philosophical canon was pruned to paint a portrait of philosophy, rational
thinking, and progress as the sole domain of the whites. The current philosophical canon, which
has remained mostly unchanged since the end of the modern period, reflects the philosophical
tradition advanced by Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers. This is the tradition that many
budding young philosophers in the West are inheriting.
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The Perpetuation of a Racist Canon
Even if one accepts that Kant's views on race shaped his (and soon after, the West's, more
generally) understanding of philosophy and its history, the conclusion that this Western canon is
racist in itself might seem far-fetched. After all, the overtly disparaging language Kant used to
discuss the abilities of nonwhites is far from openly accepted in current academic institutions.
However, because histories of philosophy still tend to want to present narratives of progress
culminating in our contemporary Western views, philosophy continues to trace its own evolution
according to a fairly narrow and uniquely European definition of philosophy. Unsurprisingly,
tracing the development of Western thought according to Western benchmarks leaves little room
for non-Western thought. In an increasingly 'global' age, however, it has become more and more
difficult to convincingly attribute the persistence of an overwhelmingly white philosophical
canon to innocent parochialism. By seeking to demonstrate progress in a simple linear narrative
of Western-defined progress, many contemporary histories of philosophy implicitly condone the
racist parochialism that is so common in the field.
Even so, the past several decades have witnessed an increasing institutional awareness of
the need for 'diversity' in the field of philosophy, as evidenced by the abundance of minorityfocused conferences and summer programs that now plaster the walls of my own school's
department office. An accute awareness of the lily white face of philosophy has prompted more
and more Western philosophers to begin addressing a potential issue – the absolute dearth of
non-Western thought in their books, syllabi, and lectures. By prefacing their otherwise
completely Eurocentric works with short explanations for the noninclusion of non-Western
philosophies, contemporary Western philosophers have found a way to 'acknowledge' non-
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Western thought without having to actually engage with the materials. The charges of racism and
ethnocentrism in the field of philosophy stem from what Robert Bernasconi refers to as the
“apparent tension between the alleged universality of reason and the fact that its upholders are so
intent on localising its historical instantiation.”46 When met with accusations of Eurocentric
parochialism, academic philosophers never even seemed to consider a total reevaluation of the
canon. Instead, we see many Western philosophers embracing their own parochialism, qualifying
all of their work as being 'Western philosophy.' As a result, non-Western philosophies could be
overlooked on the basis of being outside the scope of such projects.
Most Western philosophers today, having been educated in the white European tradition
already mentioned, know very little about ancient Indian schools of thought. In fact, many
contemporary Western philosophers know so little of non-Western intellectual traditions that they
are wholly incapable of either defending or refuting the very basic assertion that philosophy (a
supposedly universally human pursuit) existed in India (a subcontinent that produced some of the
ancient world's most advanced civilizations). Unable to talk about non-Western philosophies in
any meaningful way, contemporary philosophers increasingly seem to respond to charges of
racially-motivated parochialism by citing their own ignorance of non-Western traditions and
familiarity with Western traditions as a suitable justification for such a narrow and culturallyspecific focus. This rationale, however, is problematic. Students of any academic discipline are
expected to be at least passingly familiar with the most important movements in that discipline's
history, and philosophy is no exception. It is doubtful, for example, that a Western student could
receive a degree in philosophy without having ever gone over the works of Aristotle, Descartes,
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or Kant. These very same philosophy programs, however, produce large numbers graduates that
have never even heard of Nagarjuna or Mahavira. That philosophers are not only allowed, but
perhaps even encouraged, by many Western departments of philosophy to be totally ignorant of
Eastern traditions is telling of a belief that is endemic to academic philosophy: that Indian
philosophies are not significant to the field of philosophy as a whole.
What reveals itself, then, is a prevalent tendency among Western philosophers to
categorize non-Western thought as belonging to a category of the Other. Though no longer
explicitly ruled by the inflexible racial hierarchy found in the works of Kant, the construction of
the Western philosophical canon is still, at its core, much the same as it was 200 years ago. The
Greeks are still presented as the sole progenitors of philosophy, and a narrative of philosophy-asprogress is still widely used in contemporary histories of philosophies. Most significantly,
though, nonwhite and non-Western philosophies still struggle to find legitimacy in Western
philosophy departments. Though there is certainly an abundance of wildly diverse classical
Indian philosophical traditions that one could choose to study, they are rarely given much
consideration in Western lecture halls. The many complementary and competing Indian
philosophical traditions are often condensed in a single unit, 'Indian philosophy,' and grouped
with the equally diverse Chinese and Japanese philosophical traditions into a single, monolithic
course. Classes on 'Asian philosophy' must, then, fit the entire manifold intellectual history of the
planet's largest and most populous continent into the same number of weeks given to a class on,
say, modern European philosophy. I would like to restate this for emphasis: in a large number of
philosophy departments across the US, it would absolutely be commonplace for a class that
covers the entirety of Asian philosophical knowledge to be taught in the same amount of time
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allowed to a 300-year window of European philosophy. It is unlikely that there has ever been
someone who perfectly presented the many nuances of any single philosophical tradition over
the course of a single school term, but to even attempt to give a relatively complete overview of
the entirety of Asian philosophy in a single term is perhaps little more than an exercise in futility.
Hyper-condensed classes on the whole of Asian philosophy, though, are frequently the only
exposure students in Western universities have to non-Western thought. This tendency very
clearly demonstrates the proportionally greater value that is placed on European traditions in the
field of philosophy.
I suspect that the underlying reason for the ongoing dismissal and undervaluation of
Indian thought in Western philosophy is that, although there may be a form of philosophy present
in these texts, it is not our philosophy. 'The familiar European philosophical traditions already
poses many difficult and interesting questions,' one might say, 'so why should we be expected to
learn ancient Indian philosophy, which is unfamiliar and inconsequential to our (secular, modern,
and Western) ends?' According to Hamid Dabashi, this sort of thinking is understandable on the
one hand, because “as [with] all other people, Europeans are perfectly entitled to their own selfcentrism.”47 On the other hand, though, this view assumes that the 'we' doing philosophy have
European roots. In a modern global culture, particularly in the United States, it cannot be taken
as a given that “we” have roots in Europe, and to trace “our” history of philosophy back only
through Europe completely disregards the multicultural roots of the contemporary American
student body. Treating the culturally-specific forms and development of European philosophy as
the only forms and development of philosophy just serves to disenfranchise non-white, non-
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European students by explicitly leaving their philosophy out of the canon, yet this is exactly the
approach academic philosophy often takes. The consequence is that an entire population is
effectively rendered invisible in the field.
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Conclusion
The omission of non-Western philosophical traditions from discourses is an exercise of
power. The fact that so many programs of philosophy find it permissible to only teach Western
philosophy is the result of what Dabashi calls “the phantom memories of the time [when] 'the
West' had assured confidence and a sense of its own universalism and globality.”48 Far from
being expressions of universal truths, though, these demonstrations of institutional might make
the entire discipline of philosophy look as though it's desperately clinging on to the last vestiges
of its imperial heyday. The exclusion of Indian philosophy from the canon, then, is a holdover
from the imperialist era, when the West had a political position that allowed them to claim the
universality of its own brand of philosophy. If the field of philosophy must accept that, in a
global culture that is no longer easily divided into categories of 'colonizers' and 'colonized,' the
standards of universal truth cannot be constructed from a provincial perspective. Academic
philosophy must begin to approach its concerns from perspectives outside of its traditional
borders, and though there are certainly contemporary philosophers who are willing to
acknowledge the existence of Indian philosophy, mere acknowledgment is not enough. I have
talked to several nonwhite students that have declared philosophy's apparent preoccupation with
European thought as being off-putting. The current canon, it seems, perpetuates itself by
facilitating philosophical discussion only among those who are interested in the works and
thoughts of Europeans. As it stands, studies of Indian and other non-Western philosophies are at
the margins of the field, and this status as a very niche area of philosophical interest has its roots
in unabashed ethnocentrism and racism on the part of early modern Europeans. Not enough is

48

Dabashi, Hamid. "Can Non-Europeans Think?"

Westrope 32
being done to change this perception of non-Western philosophies as unimportant to the study of
philosophy.
To continue practicing philosophy in this Eurocentric tradition even after the value of
Indian philosophy is established is to either implicitly endorse the racism that spawned this
system or accept the current state of philosophy as a culturally-dismissive discipline in a world
rife with cross-cultural exchange. In other words, any person that does not attempt to remedy the
problem of cultural exclusivity in philosophy by taking the initiative to become familiar with the
material and to profess its relevance and legitimacy in helping to perpetuate this system.
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